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To the editor: 
The Information Sampling Task (IST) was introduced in Clark et al. (1) as a 
measure of reflection impulsivity. Performance on the IST is evaluated through the 
average number of boxes opened for each trial of the test, whether the chosen 
color was in majority or not, and ”the probability of the subject being correct at the 
point of decision [P(correct)]” (1, p 517). P(correct) is proposed calculated as a 
per-trial probability:  
𝑃 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 = !!!!!!!!                  (1) 
If n1 denotes the number of boxes opened of the chosen color and n2, the number 
of boxes opened of the unchosen color, then Z = 25 − (n1 + n2) is the number of 
unopened boxes, and A = 13 − n1 is the additional number of boxes required for a 
majority. This formula is the cumulative distribution function over the 
probabilities that the choice of color is correct. Where the probability of seeing the 
chosen color in a box is described by the binomial distribution with probability 
0.5.  
In the recent correspondence by Bennett et al. (2) it was suggested that the original 
equation (eq. 1) does not encompass the correct dependency structures in the 
problem. As a correction, it was suggested that the problem is formulated in a 
Bayesian manner, with the hypergeometric distribution (3) as the likelihood and a 
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uniform prior. 
Bayes’ theorem relates the ’posterior’ probability to the ’likelihood’, ’prior’, and 
the ’model evidence’ (see e.g. (4, eq. 1.12)): 
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 =    𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑×𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙  𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  
The posterior probability is the probability of seeing a specific output given the 
observations e.g. that the majority color is red given some observations.  
The likelihood is the probability of seeing the observations given the outcome or 
parameters e.g. the probability of seeing the colors that are seen, given that the 
majority color is red. 
The prior incorporates knowledge about the outcome or parameters that exist 
before observing anything e.g. the prior probability that the color in a box is red. 
The model evidence is the probability of observing the dataset. It functions as a 
normalizing coefficient, making the posterior a proper mathematical distribution. 
The main advantage in using Bayesian modeling is in the possibility of more 
explicitly modeling assumptions and uncertainties in a problem. The Bayesian 
formulation of the P(correct) equation is based on the assumptions that are put in 
the likelihood and the prior. These quantities must therefore be chosen carefully. 
The choice of the hypergeometric distribution as likelihood seems fit. 
When it comes to the IST, we are encountered with a prior probability used by the 
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software to distribute the colors in the boxes. We call this the ’true prior’ and it is 
based on how the test is coded in the software. We have contacted Dr. John 
Evenden, Director of science at Cambridge Cognition and Dr. Luke Clark, first 
author of (1) to ask what the true distribution is from which the different trials are 
created. The test paradigm was created with a fixed set of trials created from a 
binomial distribution where ratios more extreme than 20:5 were excluded. 
Furthermore the trials were created such that they would be similar across the two 
different conditions of the IST. 
Due to the handpicking of trials, the true prior is not given by an exact 
mathematical distribution, and we therefore need to approximate it. Considering a 
binomial distribution, which was used to create the initial set of trials, the chance 
of randomly obtaining one or more trials with a ratio more extreme than 20:5 
when sampling 21 times (since there are 21 trials in the IST) is approximately 
0.02. Given the constraints of the IST, we therefore believe that the binomial 
distribution is a reasonable estimate of the true prior.  
The distribution with which the colors are distributed is however not revealed to 
the subjects prior to the first trial, and they will therefore initiate the IST with a 
prior assumption of their own about how the colors are distributed - we will denote 
this prior the ’personal prior’. As the IST consists of multiple trials, and the pattern 
of colors is revealed after each trial, the subjects are likely to adjust their 
assumption (personal prior) over the duration of the test, such that they assume 
Axelsen	  et	  al.	  
The choice of prior in Bayesian modeling of the Information Sampling Task 
	   5	  
that extreme cases are unlikely. The personal prior will therefore approach the 
binomial distribution and not a uniform distribution.  
We believe that it is reasonable to calculate P(correct) with a Bayesian equation, 
though we believe that the prior should be binomial and not uniform as suggested 
in Bennett et al. (2). The Bayesian model using the binomial distribution, where 
the probability of each class is 0.5 as prior, and with the hypergeometric 
distribution as likelihood, is given below (3): 
𝑃 𝜃 𝑛!,𝑛! = !!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!  
𝑃 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 =   𝑃 𝜃 ≥ 13 𝑛!,𝑛! = 𝑃(𝜃 = 𝑀|𝑛!,𝑛!)!"!!!"  
Where N is the total number of boxes – in this case 25 and θ is the number of 
boxes containing the chosen color. Given the relatively simple constraints, the 
Bayesian formulation of this statistic can be shown to be exactly equal to the 
original equation from (1) (eq. 1). 
As shown above, the original equation formulated by Clark et al. (1) includes the 
relevant information regarding opened boxes, and models the correct dependencies 
of the problem. We therefore suggest that for calculating P(correct) for the IST, 
this equation should still be used. 
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As mentioned above, the personal prior can differ from the true prior in the 
beginning of the task, which indicates that there will be a learning period. This 
period is likely different from subject to subject. The P(correct) measure is hence 
a more complex construct and probably reflects several cognitive functions. If a 
more specific outcome measure is desirable we suggest that the test subjects are 
introduced to the prior in the test instructions. The following sentence could be 
added to the instruction: ”The color in each box is determined by the computer as 
heads or tails before the game starts”. Most -if not all subjects will then have an 
idea of the distribution, even if they are not familiar with the technicalities of the 
binomial distribution. 
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